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Abstract 
The government of Nigeria removed the subsidies on the prices of petroleum 
products in 1994 and set up the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF) to use some of 
the extra revenue to rehabilitate infrastructure nationwide. This evaluation was 
carried out to provide an assessment of the programme in view of its scrapping in 
2000. The Earned Value Technique was used to analyse the projects in terms of 
the time, cost, quality and other objectives using data obtained from PTF and the 
consultants. The study concludes that the programme suffered no cost overruns 
and the quality of work was generally satisfactory, but the programme suffered a 
time overrun of 38,5%. At the end of the scheduled completion period 72,6% of 
the projects were behind schedule while 17,6% were at zero completion. 
Keywords: Infrastructure, rehabilitation, cost, time, quality, performance. 
'N EVALUASIE VAN DIE WERKVERRIGTINGE VAN DIE PETROLEUM-TRUSTFONDS 
SE OPVOEDKUNDIGE- EN GESONDHEIDSORG-INFRASTRUKTUUR­
REHABILITASIE-PROGRAMME IN NOORDWES-NIGERIE 
Die Nigeriese regering het in 1994 alle subsidies afgeskaf op die prys van 
petroleumprodukte en die Petroleum (spesiale) Trusfonds (PTF) in die lewe geroep 
om ekstra belasting aan te wend ter verbetering van die land se infrastruktuur. 
Hierdie artikel gee 'n oorsig van die ramings wat gelei het tot die skraping van die pro­
gram in 2000. Die waarde-verdienste-tegniek is gebruik om die projekte te ontleed 
in terme van tyd, koste, kwaliteit en ander doelwitte ten opsigte van die data wat 
deur die Petroleum-Trustfonds (PTF) en ander konsultante verskaf is. Die studie dui 
daarop dot die program wel binne die kosteraamwerk geskied het en dot die 
gehalte van die dienste gelewer oor die algemeen goed was. Die program is 
egter gekortwiek deur 'n 38,5% oorskryding van die skedule. Teen die einde van 
die datum van voltooiing was 72,6% van die werk agter en 17,6% ongedaan gelaat. 
Sleutelwoorde: lnfrastruktuur, rehabilitasie, koste, tyd, kwaliteit, prestasie. 
Ade Yusif, Department of Quantity Surveying, Obafemi Awolowo University, lle-
lfe, Nigeria. 
Henry Agboola Odeyinka, Department of Building and Surveying, Glasgow 
Caledonian University, Glasgow, Scotland. 
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l . Introduction 
n October 1994 the Federal Government of Nigeria removed the 
I subsidies on petroleum products and raised their prices to boost 
finances. The government promised to put part of the extra revenue 
generated into a special account to rehabilitate public facilities for the 
benefit of the citizenry. To this end the government established by 
Decree No. 25 of 1994 the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF) and 
constituted a Board of Trustees to manage the account and implement 
the Fund's programmes. To underscore the importance the government 
attached to the programme, a former head of state was appointed to 
head the Board. 
The PTF was established to function as an intensive financial intervention 
agency within the framework of the then military government's 
development strategy. It sought to revive public confidence in the 
government's ability to creditably implement development programmes. 
Thus, according to the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF, 1 995a), the 
operational philosophy of the Fund was, "to achieve an efficient, honest 
and timely implementation of projects that will have positive impact in 
the upliftment of the general conditions of living for all Nigerians". In its 
mission statement the Petroleum (Special) Trust Fund (PTF, 1 995a: 1) 
sought: 
[ ... ] to establish and operate an open, modest and effective organisa­
tion for the purpose of achieving efficient, honest and timely execution 
of carefully designed socio-economic projects, spelt out or implied by 
the enabling Decree but carefully prioritised to enhance the general 
condition of living for all Nigerians in the shortest period of time possible. 
The then Head of State declared at the inauguration of the Board of 
Trustees of the PTF that: 
Over the years, a fundamental element of distrust in public account­
ability has embedded itself in the psyche of the Nigerian people like a 
cankerworm. Repeatedly disappointed by the extravagant promises 
and unfulfilled expectation, Nigerians became cynical about govern­
ment and the public morality of its agents and agencies. It is against 
this backdrop that I pronounced the pledge that the funds to be 
administered by the Board will be utilised prudently and for the purpose 
for which they are earmarked (PTF, 1995a: 19). 
The PTF was thus perceived as a new approach to public sector project 
implementation to eliminate the problems of bureaucracy, corruption 
and excessive project cost and time overruns which, according to 
Oma-Williams (1991:  6) and Odeyinka & Yusif (199) are endemic in 
Nigeria. Perhaps because it was the largest ever public works 
programme in Nigeria, the PTF programme generated a lot of 
94 
Yusif & Odeyinka • Performance evaluation 
controversies, while its protagonists hailed it as a panacea for Nigeria's 
socio-economic problems. Its critics denounced it as an unnecessary 
duplication and/or usurpation of the functions of existing government 
ministries and a waste of public funds. The arguments on both sides of 
the divide were rather emotional, subjective and political and not 
based on any scientific assessment of the programme. 
Because the present democratic government in the year 2000 has 
since scrapped the PTF, the general belief now is that it was a failure. The 
performance evaluation of the PTF's rehabilitation of educational and 
health institutions in North West Nigeria is aimed at an objective assess­
ment of the performance of the PTF programme. The North West zone 
was chosen because health and educational projects from the 
primary to the tertiary levels were executed in the zone. 
2. The PTF programme
Over the past three decades Nigeria has experienced cycles of eco­
nomic prosperity and adversity. The period of prosperity coincided with 
the oil boom of the 1970s when the world market price of crude oil, 
Nigeria's main foreign exchange earner, rose astronomically. During this 
period the Nigerian government invested massively in public infrastruc­
ture in areas such as schools, hospitals, roads, power plants, etc. The 
government's development strategy at that time emphasised the provision 
of new facilities with little attention to the maintenance of existing ones and 
the future maintenance of new ones. 
The result of the present economic collapse which started in l 981 is that 
very few new facilities have been added to the existing stock, which has 
been left to decay over the years due to lack of maintenance. Thus a 
point was reached in 1993 when it became clear to the government 
that if drastic measures were not taken not only would new public 
infrastructure not be built, but existing ones would also grind to a halt 
(Buhari, 1998: 12) It is against this background that the government 
decided in 1994 to remove the subsidy on petroleum products to estab­
lish PTF. The pump price of premium petrol, for instance, was raised from 
NO, 70 to N 11,00. The PTF was established to utilise some of the extra 
income accruing to the government from the petroleum price hike to 
rehabilitate the nation's dilapidated infrastructure. 
2.1 Programme scope 
Decree No 25 of 1994 (as amended by Decree No l of 1995), which 
established the PTF, specified seven areas for intervention by the Fund. 
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These areas were: 







For its intervention in these sectors, the PTF adopted a policy that focused 
on the following: 
Rehabilitation of existing facilities 
Establishment of facilities management systems for the mainte­
nance and sustenance of rehabilitated facilities 
Institutional strengthening and capacity building of the benefi­
ciaries/supervising agencies to enhance their capacity to 
operate and maintain rehabilitated facilities and carry out future 
expansions. 
2.2 Programme structure and organisation 
The PTF operated a zonal structure based on the six geopolitical zones 
of the country, namely the South West, South East, North West, North East, 
Middle Belt and South-South zones. 
The PTF appointed the Afri-Projects Consortium as the management 
consultant for its projects nationwide. Under them Zonal Project 
Management Consultants (ZPMCs) were appointed for each of the six 
zones and under the ZPMCs project consultants (PCs) were appointed 
for each of the projects for architectural, quantity surveying and 
engineering services. Contractors dealt directly with the PCs. Figure 1 
shows the programme structure and organisation. 
2.3 Selection of beneficiaries and projects 
The PTF's National Health and Educational Institutions Rehabilitation 
Programme (NHERP) involved educational and health institutions from 
the primary to the tertiary levels. Selected for rehabilitation were: 
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All federal universities, polytechnics, colleges of education and 
secondary schools 
Two primary schools in each of the 77 4 local council areas 
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PTF BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS 
ZPMC ZPMC ZPMC ZPMC ZPMC ZPMC 
PC PC PC 
ZPMC = Zonol Project Management 
Consultants 
C/S C!S C!S 
PC = Project Consultants 
C!S = Contractors/Suppliers 
Figure 1: Organisation structure of the PTF Programme (Achinivu 1998:3) 
One state secondary school and one state vocational school in 
each of the 1 09 senatorial districts 
One state university or polytechnic or college of education in 
each of the 36 states 
One primary/comprehensive health centre per local council 
area 
One general hospital per senatorial district 
• All federal specialist hospitals and university teaching hospitals
Selected state specialist hospitals.
State and local government officials used PTF's guidelines to select the 
institutions to be rehabilitated. 
2.4 Selection of contractors and contractual arrangements 
The Project Implementation Committee (PIC) of PTF selected contractors 
on behalf of the Board of Trustees. The selection criteria were contained 
in PTF's Guidelines for the Selection of Contractors and Suppliers (PTF, 
1995b: 1-6). The PIC adopted the selective tendering method, which is 
commonly used in Nigeria and elsewhere (Holt et al., 1995: 555; Yusif & 
Odeyinka, 2000: 5). 
The PTF saw its massive investment in construction as an opportunity to 
build capacity in the local construction industry, generate employment 
and alleviate poverty. Hence most of the contractors employed nation­
wide were indigenous. The PTF also applied the principle of "Federal 
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Character" (Affirmative Action) to select contractors from all the geopo­
litical zones of the country. As a result many contractors were employed 
who had little or no knowledge and experience of construction, as was 
the case during the oil boom era of the 1970s (Ngoka, 1974: 253-256). 
The Federation of Construction Industry, which is the professional 
organisation of government-registered building and civil engineering 
contractors in Nigeria, did not register many of the contractors. For the 
rehabilitation of educational and health institutions in the North West 
zone, a total of 5 7 4 contractors were employed. 
The contracts were awarded on a firm price basis based on the Federal 
Ministry of Works Conditions of Contract for Lump Sum Contracts (similar 
to JCT'80, Private with Quantities). The normal contract procedure of 
bargaining between client and contractor to arrive at the contract sum 
was not used. The PTF simply used their own rates, which they called 
"harmonised" rates to determine contract sums, which contractors had 
to accept. According to the PTF, to arrive at the harmonised rates it 
adopted a pricing strategy that limited allowances for profit and over­
heads to no more than 20% of the basic cost (to the contractors) of 
executing the project. This was at a time when the minimum allowance 
for most government projects was about 45% (PTF 1998: 7). The contract 
provided for an advance payment of 60% of the contract sum to the 
contractor (locally called a 'mobilisation' fee) subject to a performance 
bond guaranteed by reputable banks and insurance companies. There 
was also provision for interim monthly certificates to the contractors. 
These were processed through the Project Consultants, Zonal Project 
Management Consultants and the Management Consultants to the PTF 
for payment (Figure 1). 
3. Programme execution
The execution of the PTF programme started nationwide in 1995. By 
January 1998 the PTF had made a total financial commitment of 
N 132 012b (about US$ l 32b) to its projects. The programme period 
under review was from February 1998 to August 1999. This was perhaps 
the most unstable period in Nigeria's post-civil war history. The project 
environment was characterised by: 
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Political instability resulting from the struggles against the military 
dictatorship 
Acute shortage of construction inputs, including fuel, spare parts 
for plant and equipment, construction materials, etc 
Inflation growing at about l 0% per annum 
Economic, political and diplomatic sanctions against the country. 
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The execution of projects under the National Health and Educational 
Institutions Rehabilitation Programme in the North West zone commenced 
with 300 contracts awarded in February 1998. Table 1 gives details of these 
contracts. The second batch of 298 contracts detailed in Table 2 was 
awarded in December 1998. 
Table 1 : First batch of contracts awarded (North West Zone) 
Project Number of lots Contract sum ('ff)* 
Primary schools 149 440 364 098,75 
Federal government colleges 44 241 424 064,00 
Federal universities 17 372 745 313.70 
General hospitals 90 542 313 942,80 
Total 300 l 596 847 401,25 
* N 120 is about US$1 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2) 
Table 2: Second batch of contracts awarded (North West Zone) 
Project Number of lots Contract sum ('ff) 
Primary schools 53 176 390 398,00 
State secondary schools 12 79 041 199,27 
Primary/comprehensive health centres 121 151 397 168,40 
Tertiary/specialist hospitals 52 711 385 l 78, l 7 
Federal polytechnics 14 145 295 744,81 
Federal/State colleges of education 46 345 674 686,41 
Total 298 l 609 184 375,06 
* N 120 is about US$1 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2) 
The total contract values for projects in each state are shown in 
Table 3(o, b & c). These values range from 1'il 174 582 884, 78 (about 
US$ l 7 45 828) for Kebbi State to 1'il 823 316 548,85 (about US$8 233 165) 
for Kano State. Table 3(o, b & c) also gives the breakdown of the 
contract values for the various project types, i.e. for primary schools, 
general hospitals, etc. They range from 1'il 79 041 199,27 (about 
US$ 790 411) for state secondary schools to 1'il 711 385 1 78, 1 7 (about 
US$7 113 851) for tertiary/specialist hospitals. 
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Table 3a: Financial commitment per state and project type, (N)* 
(North West Zone) 
State Jigawa Kaduna Kano 
Primary schools 221 394 093,55 
Federal government colleges 37 383 531,28 40 790 295,00 39 306 927,00 
Federal/State colleges of educ. 25 730 695, 18 80 443 899,98 96 044 217, 16 
State secondary schools 
Federal polytechnics 118 946 7 44, 11 
Federal universities 188 720 012,37 98 165 883,16 
Primary/comprehensive 
health centres 
General hospitals 85 770 24 7, 18 117 640 736,61 l 25 502 202, 96 
Tertiary/specialist hospitals 35 715 828,09 197 151 371,04 242 903 225,03 
Total 184 600 30 l , 7 3 743 693 059,11 823 316 548,86 
* 1'il 120 is about US$ l 
Source: Norwest Consultants [1999: 19) 
Table 3b: Financial commitment per state and project type, (N)* 
(North West Zone) 
State Katsina Kebbi Sokolo/Zamfara 
Primary schools 176 390 389,00 218 970 005,20 
Federal government colleges 40 181 564,00 30 492 680,00 44 863 254,00 
Federal/State colleges of educ. 68 334 581,47 26 337 560,23 48 783 732,39 
State secondary schools 79 041 199,27 
Federal polytechnics 26 349 OOO, 70 
Federal universities 84 916 584,24 
Primary/comprehensive 
151 397 168,40 health centres 
General hospitals 99 991 302,96 81 983 046,45 126 472 597,04 
Tertiary/specialist hospitals 70 335 670,95 35 769 378, l 0 129 509 704,96 
Total 685 671 876,05 174 582 664,78 697 864 878,53 
* 1'il 120 is about US$1 
Source: Norwest Consultants [1999: 19) 
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Table 3c: Total financial commitment per state and project type, (f\l)* 
(North West Zone) 
State Total 
Primary schools 616 754 487,75 
Federal government colleges 233 018 251,28 
Federal/State colleges of educ. 345 674 686,41 
State secondary schools 79 041 199,27 
Federal polytechnics 118 946 7 44, 11 
Federal universities 371 802 443,77 
Primary/comprehensive 
151 397 168,40 health centres 
General hospitals 637 360 133,20 
Tertiary/specialist hospitals 711 385 1 78, 17 
Total 3 291 729 329,08 
* 1"1120 is about US$1
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999: 19)
The work for each institution was broken down into lots like civil works, 
electrical works, roads, telecommunications, new buildings, etc. In all a 
total of 598 contracts were awarded to 5 7 4 contractors as shown in 
Table 4. The first batch of contracts work, started on site in March 1998. 
It should have been completed by December 1998. The second batch 
work started in December 1998 to be completed by August 1999. The 
contract periods ranged from 2 to 8 months and 1 to 8 months for the 
first and second batches respectively. 
Following the threat by the two presidential candidates during the elec­
toral campaign of early 1 999 to scrap the PTF, work ground to a halt on 
most sites across the country. This was because contractors, from their 
experience of previous changes in government. were unsure if the new 
democratic government, which would emerge from the elections, 
would pay their outstanding certificates. 
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Table 4: Distribution of contracts among project types (North West Zone) 
Project type Number of institutions Number of contracts 
Primary schools 
State secondary schools 
Federal government colleges 
Colleges of education 
Federal polytechnics 
Federal universities 




















"Performance" means meeting all agreed project requirements. In this 
sense performance is the same as "total quality", which means satisfy­
ing all the requirements of the project promoter/beneficiary in the 
economic as well as the functional sense (O'Neill, 1989: l 75). 
Historically project performance has been evaluated in terms of cost, 
time and quality. Thus, according to Maloney (1990: 402) and Walker 
(1995: 263), a project is considered successful if it is completed on time, 
within budget (initial contract sum) and to the required quality 
standards. For each of these criteria (time, cost and quality) perfor­
mance is measured by comparing actual results with the optimum or 
planned results. The performance analysis for this study goes beyond 
the three general criteria of cost, time and quality to include other 
objectives contained in the PTF's mission statement and operational 
philosophy. 
The method of analysis used in this study is a modified form of Earned 
Value Analysis (EVA). EVA is normally used to track the progress of a 
pro­ject from inception to completion (Smith, 1995: 179). It is a variance 
analysis method, which quantifies the deviation of measures of actual 
performance from a standard (Kim & Ballard, 2002: 56). 
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The data required for EVA are in three measures, namely, Budgeted Cost 
of Work Scheduled (BCWS), Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) 
and Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP). These are defined as fol­
lows: 
Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) is the value of work that 
should have been done by a given point in time (Smith, 1995: 171 ). It is 
the budgeted value, usually in monetary terms or man-hours, of work to 
be done in a given period of time. 
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) is also known as the Earned 
Value. It is the budgeted value of the work actually done in a given peri­
od of time expressed in monetary terms or man-hours (Kim & Ballard, 
2002: 56). 
Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) is the actual cost incurred in 
monetary terms or man-hours of work done in a given period of time 
(Kim & Ballard, 2002: 56). 
Variance used in EVA is usually divided into two indices, namely Cost 
Variance (CV) and Schedule Variance (SV). Cost Variance (CV) is the 
difference between the budgeted cost and the actual cost of the work 
done. That is, CV = BCWP - ACWP. 
Schedule Variance (SV) is the difference between the budgeted cost of 
work actually done and the budgeted cost of the work to be done. That 
is, SV = BCWP - BCWS. These variances are interpreted as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Variance analysis in EVA 
Variance 
Cost Variance (CV) Cost overrun 
Scheduled Variance (SV) Time overrun 
Source: Kim & Ballard (2002:57) 
0 + 
On budget Under budget 
On schedule Ahead of schedule 
In addition, two performance concepts are obtained from O'Neill 
(1989: 194) as follows: 
Time Performance Index (TPI) is the ratio of the budgeted cost of 
work performed to the budgeted cost of work scheduled. That is, 
TPI = BCWP/BCWS. 
Performance Index (CPI) is the ratio of the budgeted cost of work 
performed to the actual cost of work performed. That is, 
CPI = BCWP/ACWP. These indices are interpreted as shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Performance indices in EVA 
Index <1 >1 
Time Performance Index (TPI) Time overrun On schedule Ahead of schedule 
Cost Performance Index [CPI) Cost overrun On budget Under budget 
Source: Compiled by authors 
The analysis is a sort of post-mortem, which only evaluates the status of 
the project at the end of the contract period with respect to the cost, 
time, quality and other objectives. Such post-mortem evaluations are 
obviously far too late to be of benefit to a completed project. However, 
in this case where most of the projects were not completed by the end 
of the contract period, the evaluation can be useful in pointing out mis­
takes to be avoided when trying to complete the projects or executing 
future projects (Lock, 1996: 497). Data for the analysis were collected 
from the PTF and the project consultants. 
4. l Cost evaluation 
A major aim of a client in promoting a project is to procure the required 
facilities at minimum cost within his budget (Chappell, 1991: 14-20). This 
requirement has become very critical for the governments of most 
developing countries, including Nigeria, where public funds have been 
dwindling over many years of economic decline. 
Cost efficiency was particularly important to the PTF, which set out to 
overcome the stigma of endemic cost overruns, which Oma-Williams 
(1991 :6) has put conservatively at an average of 140% of project cost 
in Nigeria. By adopting its unorthodox "harmonised pricing" contract 
method, the PTF claimed to have made 1'130 65b (about US$0 26b) in 
cost savings for the entire programme between 1995 and 1998. For the 
educational and health institutions projects in the North West zone, firm 
price contracts were used, with contractors given up to 60% of the 
contract sums as a sort of "firm price allowance" to cushion the effects 
of inflation. 
The PTF adopted very strict procedures for the issuance and approval of 
variation orders to discourage variations. In the very few cases in which 
variations were allowed the contingency sums were enough to cover 
the extra costs. Thus the cost performance index (CPI) for the educa­
tional and health institutions projects in North West Nigeria was 
practically l as no cost overrun was recorded. This also implies CV = 0 
and there was no extra cost to the client over and above the agreed 
contract sums. 
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Most construction contracts are signed with a definite contract period 
stipulated, and the extent to which this target is met is a measure of pro­
ject success. A project that is completed late can be damaging to both 
the client and the contractor. For this reason, time is one of the most 
critical factors that must be controlled in a project. 
Many things may occur on a construction site to delay the completion 
of the entire project or any given activity. Odeyinka and Yusif (1997: 31) 
have shown that the causes of construction delays can be nested in 
four layers, namely, client-caused delay, contractor-caused delay, 
extra-contractual delay and consultant-caused delay. According to 
Ogunlana and Olomolaiye (1989:  191-196) contractors handling pro­
jects in developing countries face three major problems that cause 
delay. First is the problem imposed by the construction industry's 
infrastructure, such as training of personnel, availability of plant and 
building materials. The second is that of inaccurate information and 
frequent changes in instructions and failure by clients and consultants to 
meet their obligations. The third is imposed by the contractor's own 
shortcomings. 
In Nigeria contractors usually use materials shortage as an excuse for 
project delay (Okpala & Aniekwu, 1988: 242) and clients' failure to pay 
contractors on time is a major cause of delay (Dlakwa & Culpin, 1990: 
237). It has also been established by Ngoka (1974: 253-256), Ogunlana 
and Olomolaiye (1989: 191-96), and Wahab (1977: 81, 88) that most 
projects suffer time overruns because many Nigerian con­tractors lack 
the requisite resources and expertise and are in the busi­ness of 
making money at the expense of good management. 
As a deliberate policy, the PTF divided its projects into small work pack­
ages to enable as many contractors as possible to participate in the 
programme and to minimise the contract periods. Hence the projects 
under review had very short durations ranging from l to 8 months. This 
was with a view to minimising time overruns by awarding small work 
packages, which the mostly local contractors employed could execute 
efficiently and effectively. 
For the analysis, the period used is the contract period. By comparing 
BCWP and BCWS at the end of the contract period the TPs are 
calculated in Tables 7-12 and interpreted as in Table 6. 
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Table 7: Time performance of Jigawa state projects 
Project type BCWS (W) BCWP (W) **TPI = BCWP/BCWS 
Federal government colleges 37 383 531,28 34 579 766,43 0,92 
Colleges of education 25 730 695, 18 7 075 941,17 0,27 
General hospitals 85 770 247, 18 80 538 262, 1 0 0,94 
Tertiary/Specialist hospitals 35 715 828,09 23 215 288,26 0,65 
State total 184 600 301,73 145 409 257,96 0,79 
** TPI [T ime Performance Index) 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2-14) 
Table 8: Time performance of Kaduna state projects 
Project type BCWS(W) BCWP (W) **TPI = BCWP/BCWS 
Federal government colleges 40 790 295,00 36 956 007,27 0,91 
Colleges of education 80 443 899, 98 22 685 1 79, 79 0,28 
Federal polythechnics 118 946 7 44, 11 38 657 691,84 0,33 
Federal universities 188 720 012,37 160 034 5 70,49 0,85 
General hospitals 117 640 736,61 1 08 81 7 681,36 0,92 
Tertiary/Specialist hospitals 197 151 371,04 41 204 636,55 0,21 
State total 743 693 059,11 408 355 767,30 0,55 
** TPI (T ime Performance Index) 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2-14) 
Table 9: Time performance of Kano state projects 
Project type BCWS (W) BCWP (W) **TPI = BCWP/BCWS 
Primary schools 221 394 093,55 219 932 892,53 0,99 
Federal government colleges 39 306 972,00 32,467 521,70 0,83 
Colleges of education 96 044 217,16 54 264 982, 70 0,57 
Federal universities 98 165 883,16 89 330 953,68 0,91 
General hospitals 1 25 502 202, 98 1 22 615 652,31 0,98 
Tertiary/Specialist hospitals 242 903 225,03 63 154 838,51 0,26 
State total 823 316 548,88 581 766 841,43 0,71 
** TPI (Time Performance Index) 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2-14) 
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Table l 0: Time performance of Katsina state projects 
Project type BCWS(fl:) BCWP (fl:) **TPI = BCWP/BCWS 
Primary schools 176 390 389,00 106 010 623.79 0,60 
Federal government colleges 40 181 564,00 37 328 672,96 0,93 
Colleges of education 68 334 581.47 36 285 662.7 6 0,53 
State secondary schools 79 041 199,27 16 993 857,84 0,21 
Primary/Comprehensive 
health centres 151 397 168.40 38 OOO 689,27 0,25 
General hospttals 99 991 302,96 75 393 442.43 0.75 
Tertiary/Specialist hospitals 70 335 670,95 9 706 322,59 0,14 
State total 685 671 876,05 320 719 271,64 0,47 
** TPI (Time Performance Index) 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2-14) 
Table 11 : Time performance of Kebbi state projects 
Project type BCWS(fl:) BCWP (W) **TPI = BCWP/BCWS 
Federal government colleges 30 492 680,00 29 486 421.56 0,97 
Colleges of education 26 337 560,23 6 321 014.46 0,24 
General hospitals 81 983 046.45 78 457 775.45 0,96 
Tertiary/Specialist hospitals 35 769 378, l 0 26 827 033,58 0.75 
State total 174 582 664,78 141 092 245,05 0,81 
** TPI (Time Performance Index) 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2-14) 
The closer the TPI is to unity the better the time perfcwmance. Thus from 
Tables 7 to 12 the best project type performance was in Primary Schools 
in Kano State (TPI = 0, 99) and the worst was in Federal Polytechnics in 
Sokoto/Zamfara (TPI = 0,00). This means that the programme complet­
ed 99% of the value of work for primary schools in Kano State and 0% 
for Federal Polytechnics in Sokoto/Zamfara State by the end of the 
contract period. 
The best state in time performance was Kebbi (overall TPI for all 
projects = 0, 81) and the worst was Katsina with overall TPI = 0.4 7. This 
means 81 % of the value of all the projects in Kebbi and 4 7% in Katsina 
were completed by the end of the contract period (Table 13). 
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Table 12: Time performance of Sokoto/Zamfara state projects 
Project type BCWS(N) BCWP(N) **TPI = BCWP/BCWS 
Primary schools 218 970 005,20 171 453 514,07 0,78 
Federal government colleges 44 863 254,00 38 268 355,66 0,85 
Colleges of education 48 783 732,39 19 513 492,96 0,40 
Federal polytechnics 26 349 OOO, 70 0,00 0,00 
Federal uniVersties 84 916 584,24 74 302 011,21 0,88 
General hospitals 126 472 597,04 107 375 234,89 0,85 
Tertiary/Specialist hospitals 129 509 704,96 16 188 713,12 0,13 
State total 679 864 878,53 427 101 321,91 0,63 
** TPI (Time Performance Index) 
Source: Norwest Consultants (1999:2-14) 
Table 13: Time performance of the PTF programme in the North West Zone 







Total for North West Zone 
184 600 301,73 
743 693 059, 11 
823 316 548,88 
685 671 876,05 
174 582 664,78 
679 864 878,53 
3 291 729 329,08 
Source: Norwest Consultants [1999:2-14) 
145 409 257,96 0.79 
408 355 767,30 0,55 
581 766 841,43 0.71 
320 719 271,64 0,47 
141 092 245,05 0,81 
427 101 321,91 0,63 
2 024 444 705,29 0,62 
From Table 13 the overall TPI for the PTF'programme for health and edu­
cational facilities in the North West Zone was 0,62. This means that the 
programme achieved 62% of the value of its projects by the end of the 
programme period. Thus by the end of the contract periods for its pro­
jects the programme had suffered a time overrun. 
The time overrun or schedule variance (SV) is calculated as 
SV = 13CM' - BON$ X l 00% = 2 024 444 705.'29 - 3 291 729 329.08 X l 00 = -38,5% 
BCWS 3 291 729 329,08 
From Table 5, this figure represents a time-overrun equal to 38.5% of the 
original (planned) programme duration. This means that if the general 
level of performance did not change, the project durations for the 
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programme would be extended by 38,5% to complete the projects. 
Most of the of the projects are likely to perform worse than this average 
figure if they are ever completed, as three years after the original con­
tract periods they are yet to be completed. Many may end up swelling 
the large number of abandoned projects already littering the nation's 
landscape. 
Of the 598 contracts executed under the programme in the North West 
zone 434 (72,6%) suffered delay. One hundred and five (l 05) of the 
contracts (17,56%) achieved zero completion by the end of the 
contract period. The consultants throughout the contract period could 
not locate Fourteen (14) contractors who collected the 60% advance 
payment. 
It is not surprising that Katsina had the worst performance, as all l 4 
contractors who could not be located by the consultants were 
employed in the state and 3 7 of the projects in the state, were at zero 
completion by the end of their contract periods .On the other hand, 
Kebbi had only four projects at zero completion by the end of their 
contract periods and all contractors employed for the state took 
possession of their sites. Only l 26 of the 336 educational projects 
(37,5%) and 51 of the 262 health projects (19,5%) in the zone were 
completed on schedule. Overall, the programme achieved only 27,3% 
completion of its projects on schedule in the North West Zone. 
4.3 Quality evaluation 
Quality, according to Maloney (1990: 400), involves doing things the 
right way the first time. The work done must conform to the specifications 
agreed on for the project. Quality performance is thus measured by the 
extent to which the completed work possesses the attributes desired by 
the client and the designer. Poor quality performance results in 
increased rework, which may lead to time and co� overruns. 
The quality of work done was generally good. According to the consul­
tants' reports (Norwest, 1999: 1-3) in only 29 (4,8%) of the 598 contracts 
were defects found during construction and during the defects liability 
period. In only 2 (0,33%) of the contracts was the quality of work found 
to be totally unacceptable. This is rather strange as many of the con­
tractors lacked the experience and the expertise for construction. 
Perhaps the contractors were able to achieve good quality because of 
the simplicity of the projects. Most of the work involved the renovation of 
very simple single storey buildings, which required neither the highly 
skilled labour nor the plant and equipment which most of the local 
contractors lack. 
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5. The roles of the project participants
The participants directly involved in a construction project include 
clients, consultants and contractors. Seeley (l997: l37- l44) has 
discussed the roles of these participants in the administration of con­
struction projects. Hillebrandt (1985:  l 0-23) and Seeley (1997: l 0) have 
also stressed the roles of indirect participants such as government and 
its agencies and manufacturers. The performance of these participants 
in their respective roles determines to a large extent the success or fail­
ure of a project. 
It can be seen from the performance evaluation that the programme 
under review was successful in terms of cost and product quality. In 
terms of time, however, the programme performed below expectation. 
Responsibility for this failure can be attributed to all the three major par­
ticipants - the client, the contractor and the consultants. PTF (the client) 
failed to meet its financial obligations to both the contractors and the 
consultants. The major reason contractors gave for project delay was 
the contractors' cash flow problems resulting from unpaid certificates. 
The PTF's financial problems stemmed from the government's failure to 
fulfil its commitments to the Fund. For instance, between 1995 and 
1998, out of a total commitment of N 198 25b (about US$ l 65b) the 
governmentallocated only N l 09 822b (about US$0 91 b) to PTF. This 
represents a shortfall of 44,6%. PTF's financial problems worsened when 
the government widened the scope of the programme to include many 
more areas of intervention despite the reduced allocation to the Fund 
(PTF, 1998:3) 
Many contractors performed below expectation because they lacked 
the expertise and the capital and equipment base required for the 
business of construction. Some of them came into construction for the 
first time to take advantage of the 60% advance payment offered by 
PTF. Some completed well below 60% of the contract value and aban­
doned their sites after collecting 60% of the contract sum as advance 
payment. The project consultants (PCs) had no representatives on site. 
This was because the client refused to pay for it. Hence the only contact 
between the contractor and the PCs was during the monthly site 
meetings. Furthermore, the sites were scattered all over the states in 
places with no telecommunications links with the state capita'I where the 
PCs were based. This delayed consultants' instructions to contractors 
and the contractors' compliance. The consultants also suffered a 
serious financial crisis for about six months of the period under review 
when the PTF failed to pay them their fees. During this period, the 
monthly progress reports of the consultants were produced two to 
three months behind schedule. 
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The programme organisation (Figure 1) was rather bureaucratic as 
contractors had to process their certificates through the PCs, ZPMCs 
and the Management Consultants to the client. This was a major cause 
of delay in paying contractors. The PTF programme commenced in 
l 995 but it was only in l 998 that a decision was taken to establish an 
independent Project Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (PMEU). By the time 
PMEU became fully operational in 1999, the PTF programme had 
ground to a halt as a result of the decision by the new democratic 
government to scrap the Fund. A major innovation in the PTF 
programme was the policy of establishing a facilities management 
system for each rehabilitated institution. This was never implemented. 
PTF was scrapped in the year 2000 and replaced with a caretaker body 
to complete its projects. Unfortunately, most of the delayed projects 
have remained uncompleted to date and have joined the large stock 
of abandoned projects, which litter Nigeria's landscape. 
6. Conclusion
The study has shown that the PTF programme was successful in terms of 
cost and quality. However, the cost performance is deceptive because 
most of the projects have been abandoned since 1999. If they were to 
be completed today at current prices the cost overrun could exceed 
the average figure of 140% quoted for Nigeria. The huge sums of 
money tied down by these uncompleted projects are a colossal waste. 
The project performed below expectation in terms of completion time. 
At the end of the scheduled completion period the projects had 
suffered a time overrun of 38,5% on average. The longest project 
completion period for the programme was 8 months. Thus, if the 
projects were to be completed today, four years behind schedule, the 
time overrun would be over 400%. 
The unsatisfactory time performance can be attributed to both internal 
and external causes. The internal cause was the failure of the major pro­
ject participants, especially the client and the contractors, to discharge 
their responsibilities. The client failed to pay the mostly local, small-scale 
contractors with very little working capital as and when due. Most of the 
contractors lacked the basic resources required for the business of 
construction. The major external cause was the political instability, which 
the nation suffered during the programme period. Most contractors 
abandoned their sites because from their experience of previous 
changes of government in Nigeria, they were not sure if the incoming 
civilian government would honour contracts entered into by the outgo­
ing military dictatorship. To date, (three years after the programme 
was scrapped) many contractors and consultants are yet to be paid 
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for the work done. 
An important lesson from the PTF programme is that, in addition to public 
need, availability of funds should be a major criterion for embarking on 
government projects. In an attempt to please everybody the PTF embarked 
on too many projects at the same time (for purely political reasons) with no 
guarantee of adequate funding from the government. The result is that most 
of the projects remain uncompleted to date and the fundamental element 
of distrust in public accountability, which the PTF set out to remove, has been 
further entrenched instead. 
It is recommended that: 
The programme must be evaluated in the other five zones so 
that the results can be aggregated to give the PTF programme a 
national performance rating 
The completion cost for all the uncompleted projects should be 
assessed to know the financial requirements for their completion 
• As a deliberate government policy all the uncompleted PTF and
other public projects should be completed before any new
projects are initiated. This is the only way the huge financial
investments in these projects can be recovered in the public
interest. The government should set a time frame for the
completion of all such projects
The government should invest in local capacity building in the
Nigerian construction industry as a long-term policy to address
the problem of low productivity of indigenous contractors. Most
of the indigenous contractors engaged in the PTF programme
performed far below expectation because (as other studies have
shown) they lacked the expertise, financial resources and equip­
ment base required for present-day construction.
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